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Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela: Dark Times
Ahead for Class Arbitrations
JOANNA NIWOROWSKI*
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was enacted in 1925 to
combat judicial hostility towards arbitration. Over the years, the
U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted this statute as evidencing a
pro-arbitration policy and has upheld the use of arbitration clauses in a variety of contracts. Unfortunately, while the FAA was able
to overcome the hostility towards arbitration, it was not able to
stop the Court from finding a new target: class arbitrations.
This Comment analyzes the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela. In critiquing the Court’s continued
erosion of the availability of class arbitrations, this Comment considers the negative effects of the pro-business decision on employees and consumers who are subject to arbitration clauses. This
Comment concludes that congressional action is needed to reverse
the years of flawed class arbitration jurisprudence.
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INTRODUCTION
Nearly a decade has passed since the Supreme Court decided in
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International Corp.1 that to
compel class arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act2 (the
“FAA” or the “Act”) there must be a “contractual basis for concluding that the part[ies] agreed to do so.”3 The Court in that case
concluded that the silence of the agreement at issue was not
enough to compel arbitration.4 The decision, however, left a few
unanswered questions. The Court did not address what would happen if the agreement was not silent but merely ambiguous.5 Nor
1
2
3
4
5

Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684.
Id. at 687.
See id. at 687 n.10.
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did the Court specify what it meant exactly by a “contractual basis” and what was necessary in an agreement to meet that threshold.6 These questions were left up in the air until the Supreme
Court decided Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela in 2019.7
In Lamps Plus, the Court was once again faced with the question of whether to compel class arbitration.8 The Court had to come
face to face with the questions it left unanswered in StoltNielsen9—“whether, consistent with the FAA, an ambiguous
agreement can provide the necessary ‘contractual basis’ for compelling class arbitration.”10 It held that ambiguity, like silence,
cannot constitute a sufficient contractual basis for compelling class
arbitration.11
The Lamps Plus decision is a continuation of the Court’s
flawed class arbitration jurisprudence. This Comment aims to analyze the reasoning of the Lamps Plus Court to point out that, while
the decision is a natural progression of the Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence, it rests on an unsound foundation. The Lamps
Plus Court’s decision was predictable in its incorrect characterization of class arbitration as less efficient than individual arbitration
and as inherently incompatible with the goals of the FAA.12 Furthermore, this Comment argues that the Court should not have so
hastily preempted the state contract rule known as contra
proferentem (the “anti-drafter rule”), a widely used, neutral contract rule that dictates reading an ambiguous contract against the
drafter.13
This Comment’s main goal is to point out the potential negative impact of this decision on employees and consumers—
individuals with relatively little bargaining power.14 The use of
6

See id.
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
8
See id. at 1412.
9
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 662.
10
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 684).
11
Id. at 1417.
12
See id. at 1415–17.
13
11 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW
OF CONTRACTS § 32:12 (4th ed. 2012).
14
See Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L. J. 2804,
7
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mandatory arbitration clauses in employment and consumer contracts has been on the rise in recent years.15 The Supreme Court
has previously upheld the use of class action waivers in arbitration
agreements, making it easier for employers and businesses to prevent class arbitrations from being brought.16 The effect of Lamps
Plus will be to further reduce the availability of class arbitrations—
even where there is no explicit class waiver—with little hope for
employees or consumers to be able to negotiate for this procedural
option.
Part I of this Comment lays out basic background information
about the Federal Arbitration Act and discusses two significant
Supreme Court cases that form the basis for the holding in Lamps
Plus. Part II lays out the relevant background facts and procedural
history of Lamps Plus as well as the reasoning of the majority,
concurring, and dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes the majority’s decision, discussing its basis in legislative history, the majority’s view of arbitration, and the preemption of the contra
proferentem rule. Part III concludes by discussing the decision’s
future implications on employees and consumers and calls for congressional action to address the issues surrounding the FAA and
class arbitrations.

2863–74 (2015) (discussing expansion of FAA to parties with little bargaining
power).
15
See CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY:
REPORT TO CONGRESS 9–10 (2015) (summarizing that “[t]ens of millions of
consumers use consumer financial products or services” that are subject to mandatory arbitration and nearly all of which include class waivers); ALEXANDER
J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE GROWING USE OF MANDATORY
ARBITRATION, 1–2 (2018), https://www.epi.org/publication/the-growing-use-ofmandatory-arbitration-access-to-the-courts-is-now-barred-for-more-than-60million-american-workers/ (discussing results of a study that found that amount
of workers subject to mandatory arbitration has more than doubled since early
2000s and now exceeds fifty-five percent).
16
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 346–48,
352 (2011) (preempting a state law that conditioned enforceability of consumer
contract arbitration agreements on availability of class arbitration procedures).
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BACKGROUND

A.

The Federal Arbitration Act and the Preemption Doctrine
The Federal Arbitration Act17 was enacted in 1925 to make arbitration agreements “in any maritime transaction or . . . contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce” valid and enforceable.18 Section 2 of the FAA provides that:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a
contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the
refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, or
an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract,
transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.19
Through this Section, Congress intended to ensure arbitration
agreements were generally valid and enforceable by placing them
“upon the same footing as other contracts, where [they] belong . . . .”20 The motivation behind the passage of the FAA was to
combat judicial hostility towards arbitration that would often interfere with enforcement of contracts that contained arbitration clauses.21
17

9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16.
Id. at § 2; JON O. SHIMABUKURO & JENNIFER A. STAMAN, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44960, MANDATORY ARBITRATION AND THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION
ACT 1 (2017).
19
9 U.S.C. § 2; see also Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating that Section 2 of FAA is “primary substantive provision of the Act”).
20
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1 (1924) (“The purpose of this bill is to make
valid and enforceable agreements for arbitration contained in contracts involving
interstate commerce or within the jurisdiction or admiralty, or which may be the
subject of litigation in the Federal courts.”); see also S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2
(1924) (“The purpose of the bill is clearly set forth in section 2 . . . .”).
21
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2; SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18,
at 2.
18

262

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 75:257

Over the years, the Supreme Court has interpreted this statute
as evidencing “a national policy favoring arbitration” that “withdrew the power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties agreed to resolve by
arbitration.”22 The Court has also stated that a “fundamental principle” of the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of contract”23 and
that the statute requires courts to “enforce arbitration agreements
according to their terms.”24
Generally, under the FAA, state contract rules govern arbitration clauses and their interpretation and enforcement.25 However,
the Court has, at times, preempted state contract law that interfered
with arbitration contracts and was inconsistent with the goals and
purposes of the FAA.26 The “saving clause” in Section 2 of the
FAA 27—“save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract”28—has been interpreted by the Supreme Court to limit the possible grounds on which a court may
deny the enforcement of an arbitration provision.29 The Court has
interpreted the saving clause to mean that “generally applicable
22

Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); see also Jodi Wilson,
How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act,
63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 91, 97 (2012) (discussing how Court’s policy favoring arbitration turned arbitration agreements into “super contracts”).
23
Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 67 (2010).
24
Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1619 (2018).
25
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019);
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5.
26
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5; see also Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989)
(“[S]tate law may nonetheless be pre-empted to the extent that it actually conflicts with federal law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’” (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941))); Maureen A.
Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute: The Federal Arbitration Act and
Displacement of Agency Regulation, 5 Y.B. ARB. & MEDIATION 59, 64 (2013)
[hereinafter Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute] (“Lacking an express
preemptive intent, FAA preemption is implied based on the broadest form of
‘conflict preemption,’ which generally warrants narrow construction.”).
27
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011).
28
9 U.S.C. § 2.
29
SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 5; see also Wilson, supra
note 22, at 107.
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contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may
be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements without contravening § 2” of the FAA.30 Thus, arbitration contracts may be held to
be invalid and unenforceable under state law principles but only
through such principles that are generally applicable to all contracts and are not otherwise hostile to arbitration agreements.31 The
saving clause, the Court has stated, does not intend “to preserve
state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the FAA’s objectives,” namely, the goal of ensuring the enforcement of arbitration agreements.32
B.

Supreme Court Precedent Underlying Lamps Plus

1. STOLT-NIELSEN V. ANIMALFEEDS
One of the key precedents underlying the Lamps Plus decision
was Stolt-Nielsen, which involved a dispute between a shipping
company, Stolt-Nielsen S.A., and its customers over alleged antitrust violations.33 AnimalFeeds International Corp., one of StoltNielsen’s customers, shipped goods around the world pursuant to a
standard maritime contract known as a “charter party,” which contained an arbitration clause.34 After the Second Circuit held that the
parties had to arbitrate their dispute, AnimalFeeds served StoltNielsen with a demand for class arbitration, seeking to bring a
30

Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (“[The] saving clause permits agreements to arbitrate to be invalidated by ‘generally applicable contract defenses,
such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability,’ but not by defenses that apply only
to arbitration or that derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement to
arbitrate is at issue.” (quoting Doctor’s Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687)); Doctor’s
Assocs., 517 U.S. at 687 (“Courts may not . . . invalidate arbitration agreements
under state laws applicable only to arbitration provisions.”).
32
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343; see also Weston, The Accidental
Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64 (“Since Southland, the preemption
doctrine has become an oft-used mechanism for the Supreme Court to overturn
state legislation that not only invalidate arbitration agreements or single out
arbitration agreements for different treatment than other contracts, but increasingly to overturn state laws deemed as ‘hostile’ towards arbitration.”).
33
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 666–67
(2010).
34
Id.
31
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class action on behalf of all the customers that purchased transportation services from Stolt-Nielsen.35 The parties stipulated that the
“arbitration clause was ‘silent’ with respect to class arbitration”
and entered into a supplemental agreement that provided that the
question of whether class arbitration was permitted was to be submitted to a panel of arbitrators.36 The panel concluded that the particular arbitration clause did allow class arbitration proceedings.37
The Supreme Court was presented with the question of
“whether imposing class arbitration on parties whose arbitration
clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue is consistent with the” FAA.38 The
Court held that “a party may not be compelled under the FAA to
submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for
concluding that the party agreed to do so.”39 Justice Alito, writing
for the majority, reasoned that, because a foundational principle of
the FAA is that “arbitration is a matter of consent,” an arbitrator
may not infer an implicit agreement to permit class arbitration
solely from the arbitration agreement.40 The majority explained
that class arbitration is drastically different from bilateral arbitration, which has the benefits of “lower costs, greater efficiency and
speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”41 Thus, the parties’ silence on the issue of class
proceedings is not enough to find consent to class arbitration.42
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg pointed out that, while “the
Court apparently demands contractual language one can read as
affirmatively authorizing class arbitration,” the Court’s decision
was seemingly limited as it “d[id] not insist on express consent to
class arbitration.”43 In addition, she noted that the holding “apparently spare[d] from its affirmative-authorization requirement con35

Id. at 667–68.
Id. at 668.
37
Id. at 669.
38
Id. at 666.
39
Id. at 684.
40
See id. at 684–85; see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989) (“Arbitration under the Act is a
matter of consent, not coercion . . . .”).
41
Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–87.
42
See id.
43
Id. at 697–99 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
36
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tracts of adhesion presented on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.”44 These
limitations seemed to be true, at least until the Court’s decision in
Lamps Plus this year.
2. AT&T MOBILITY V. CONCEPCION
Another significant case underlying the Lamps Plus decision
was AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion.45 The Court in Concepcion held that the FAA preempted a California judicial rule that
classified most class arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable.46 The dispute in the case arose between AT&T
and a class of its customers, who alleged that AT&T had “engaged
in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on phones it
advertised as free.”47 Vincent and Liza Concepcion, whose complaint was consolidated with the class, had entered into a contract
with AT&T for the sale and service of cellphones, which included
an arbitration clause and a class arbitration waiver.48 When AT&T
moved to compel arbitration of the Concepcions’ claim, the Concepcions opposed arbitration, arguing that “the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and unlawfully exculpatory under California law because it disallowed classwide procedures.”49
The Supreme Court was faced with the question of “whether
the FAA prohibits States from conditioning the enforceability of
certain arbitration agreements on the availability of classwide arbitration procedures.”50 Specifically, the Court was considering California’s “Discover Bank rule,” which deemed most class action
waivers in consumer contracts unconscionable51 and which the
courts below applied to deem the arbitration clause at issue unconscionable.52 The Court, considering the saving clause, reasoned
that, “[w]hen state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the analysis is straightforward: The conflicting
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 699.
AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
Id. at 340, 352.
Id. at 337.
Id. at 336–37.
Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 336.
Id. at 340.
Id. at 338.
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rule is displaced by the FAA.”53 But where a generally applicable
doctrine, such as duress or unconscionability, “is alleged to have
been applied in a fashion that disfavors arbitration,” the inquiry is
“more complex.”54 The Court stated that, even though “§ 2’s saving clause preserves generally applicable contract defenses, nothing in it suggests an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as
an obstacle to the accomplishment of the FAA’s objectives.”55 In
the present case, because “the availability of classwide arbitration
interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the FAA,” the state law rule interfered with the FAA and had to be preempted.56
The majority saw California’s rule as interfering with arbitration for three reasons. First, the Court stated that switching from
bilateral arbitration to class proceedings would not allow the parties to take advantage of the fundamental advantages of bilateral
arbitration, namely its informality.57 This would make the whole
process “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”58 The Court saw the point of
arbitration as allowing the parties to have a specially designed process that allows for efficient dispute resolution and where informality, which translated into greater speed of resolution and a reduction in costs, was desirable.59 Second, the Court found that
class arbitration required procedural formality to ensure that absent
class members were afforded their due process and would be

53

See id. at 339–41 (citing Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 353 (2008)).
Id. at 341; see also Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 492 n.9 (1987) (noting that FAA may preempt even grounds that were traditionally considered to
exist “at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” and that courts cannot “rely on the uniqueness of an agreement to arbitrate as a basis for a state-law
holding that enforcement would be unconscionable, for this would enable the
court to effect what . . . the state legislature cannot”).
55
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343.
56
Id. at 344, 352.
57
Id. at 348.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 344–45; see also Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 357–59 (2008)
(noting that main objective of an arbitral agreement is “streamlined proceedings
and expeditious results,” and that preempting certain state law rules would “hinder speedy resolution of the controversy”).
54
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bound by the judgment.60 It was unlikely, the Court argued, that
Congress intended to give arbitrators the responsibility of ensuring
that absent members’ due process rights were satisfied.61 Finally,
the Court found that arbitration greatly increased the risks for defendants because class arbitration carried much higher stakes for
defendants with little chance for effective judicial review of the
arbitration decision.62 Thus, because it “st[ood] as an obstacle to
the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,” the California state law rule was preempted by
the FAA.63
The Concepcion decision invoked a notable dissent from Justice Breyer. Justice Breyer disagreed with the majority’s assertion
that the California law was inconsistent with the FAA and its primary objective.64 He saw the rule as an application of the general
principle of unconscionability that, by its terms, would have applied to any contract as required by the FAA.65 He also saw the
rule as being consistent with the purpose behind the Act, pointing
out why he believed the majority’s view of the FAA’s purpose was
skewed.66 According to Justice Breyer, the purpose behind the
FAA has been described by the Court as “one of ‘ensur[ing] judicial enforcement’ of arbitration agreements.”67 Justice Breyer
points out that Congress’s intent was to combat the judicial hostility towards arbitration that was prevalent before the Act’s passage,
a goal Congress sought to achieve by “placing agreements to arbitrate ‘upon the same footing as other contracts.’”68 Justice Breyer
further argued that the California law was consistent with Section
60

Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 349.
Id.
62
Id. at 350–51.
63
Id. at 352 (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
64
Id. at 357 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
65
See id. at 358–59.
66
See id. at 359–62.
67
See id. at 359 (alteration in original) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc.
v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219 (1985)); see also Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at
219 (“We . . . reject the suggestion that the overriding goal of the Arbitration
Act was to promote the expeditious resolution of claims.”).
68
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 360 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also S. REP. NO.
68-536, at 2 (1924) (noting that purpose of FAA is “clearly set forth in section
2” of Act).
61
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2, and thus the FAA’s purpose, because it put all agreements on the
same footing by placing the same limitation on both arbitration and
litigation.69 He also went on to question the majority’s assertion
that “individual, rather than class, arbitration is a ‘fundamental
attribut[e]’ of arbitration.”70 He pointed out that class arbitration
may have certain advantages, such as being more expeditious than
class actions in court and more efficient than thousands of separate
proceedings.71 Class arbitration may also preserve the claimants’
right to pursue small-dollar claims where they would have to otherwise abandon them due to the high cost of individual arbitration.72 Justice Breyer concluded that there was little support or reason for the preemption of the state law.73
II.

LAMPS PLUS, INC. V. VARELA

A.
Background Facts and Procedural Posture
Lamps Plus involved a dispute between the company Lamps
Plus and its employees.74 In 2016, one of the company’s employees was tricked by a hacker, who had impersonated a company
official, into disclosing the tax information of about 1,300 other
Lamps Plus employees.75 Soon after the incident, a fraudulent tax
return was filed in the name of Frank Varela, one of the Lamps
Plus employees whose information was hacked.76
69

See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 362 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. (alteration in original).
71
Id. at 363.
72
Id. at 365–66. Justice Breyer’s dissent also highlighted that the Court had
previously authorized complex arbitration proceedings, such as antitrust claims
in an international transaction in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler ChryslerPlymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985), and had upheld state laws that in effect
slowed down arbitration, such as a California state law staying arbitration until
the resolution of related litigation in Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of
Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 468 (1989), further
calling into doubt the majority’s assertions that arbitration is not compatible
with class proceedings. See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 366 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
73
See Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 367 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
74
Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1412–13 (2019).
75
Id. at 1412.
76
Id.
70

2020]

DARK TIMES AHEAD FOR CLASS ARBITRATIONS

269

Many of the employees, including Frank Varela, had signed an
arbitration agreement when beginning their employment at Lamps
Plus.77 The arbitration clause stated that “arbitration shall be in lieu
of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to
[the employee’s] employment.”78 Nevertheless, Varela brought a
suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of
California, raising both federal and state law claims on behalf of a
putative class of other employees who had been affected by the
data breach.79 In response, Lamps Plus moved for an order to compel arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement to
compel individual, rather than class, arbitration and to dismiss the
pending lawsuit.80 The Central District of California granted the
motion to compel and dismissed the suit without prejudice but
compelled class arbitration.81
Lamps Plus appealed the authorization of class arbitration, but
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling.82 The Ninth
Circuit reasoned that, although the arbitration agreement at issue
did not expressly mention class arbitration, the issue was not controlled by Stolt-Nielsen.83 because there was no stipulation here as
to the silence of the arbitration clause with respect to class arbitration.84 In addition, the mere failure of the agreement to mention
class proceedings was not the silence that Stolt-Nielsen found to be
dispositive.85 The Ninth Circuit, instead, found the arbitration
agreement to be ambiguous in regard to class arbitration.86 The
Ninth Circuit applied California law, which dictated that, where a
77

Id. at 1413.
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
84
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1413.
85
Id.
86
See id. The Ninth Circuit considered both parties’ arguments. Id. On one
hand, Lamps Plus argued that the phrasing of the agreement contemplated
“purely binary claims.” Id. On the other hand, Varela argued that other phrases
were ambiguous enough to permit class arbitration, such as the phrase “arbitration shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or other civil legal proceedings relating to my employment.” Id.
78
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contract is ambiguous, the court should construe the ambiguity
against the drafter of the contract.87 Construing the contract in favor of Varela and against Lamps Plus, the drafter of the contract,
the Court authorized class arbitration.88 Thereafter, Lamps Plus
petitioned for a writ of certiorari, arguing that the Ninth Circuit did
not follow the controlling precedent of Stolt-Nielsen.89
B.
The Majority Opinion
After discussing the Court’s jurisdiction and parties’ standing
to appeal, the majority, led by Chief Justice Roberts, focused its
discussion on the arbitration agreement at issue.90 The Court deferred to the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation and application of state
law and accepted that the agreement at issue was “ambiguous” on
the issue of class arbitration.91 Thus, the Court saw the question at
issue as “whether, consistent with the FAA, an ambiguous agreement can provide the necessary ‘contractual basis’ for compelling
class arbitration.”92 For the reasons discussed below, the Court
held that, based on Stolt-Nielsen,93 an ambiguous agreement could
not provide sufficient contractual basis.94
The Court’s primary basis for its decision was that, because
class arbitration is so different from individualized arbitration and
undermines the benefits of individual arbitration, the FAA requires
more than ambiguity to ensure the parties actually agreed to class
arbitration.95 The majority began by pointing out that the FAA requires the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
87

Id.
Id.
89
Id.
90
See id. at 1414–15.
91
Id. (“In California, an agreement is ambiguous ‘when it is capable of two
or more constructions, both of which are reasonable.’” (quoting Varela v. Lamps
Plus, Inc., 701 F. App’x 670, 672 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 771 F. App’x 418
(9th Cir. 2019) (mem.)).
92
Id. at 1415 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559
U.S. 662, 684 (2010)).
93
See generally 559 U.S. at 684 (“[A] party may not be compelled under
the FAA to submit to class arbitration unless there is a contractual basis for concluding that the party agreed to do so.”).
94
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415.
95
Id.
88
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terms.96 Usually, the Court stated, courts can accomplish this by
relying on state contract law.97 However, if the state law interferes
or “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of
the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA,” then the state law is
preempted by the Act.98 The Court framed the present issue as the
conflict between the California state contract law regarding ambiguity and a fundamental principle of the FAA, “namely, that arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion.’”99 According to the
Court, courts and arbitrators aspire to carry out parties’ intentions.100 To do so, the majority remarked, the decision maker must
recognize the “‘fundamental’ difference” between class arbitration
and the traditional, individual arbitration “envisioned by the
FAA.”101 The majority framed individual arbitration as a process
that parties agree to in order to enjoy the benefits of private dispute
resolution.102 These benefits, the Court said, are “lower costs,
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to resolve specialized disputes.”103 In contrast, the majority saw class arbitration as lacking those benefits, “sacrific[ing] the
principal advantage of arbitration—its informality—and mak[ing]
the process slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedural morass than final judgment.”104 The Court, following its previous reasoning from Stolt-Nielsen, concluded that, “because of
these ‘crucial differences’ between individual and class arbitration . . . there [wa]s ‘reason to doubt the parties’ mutual consent to

96

Id.
Id.
98
Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352
(2011)).
99
Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
681 (2010)).
100
Id. at 1416.
101
Id.
102
See id.
103
Id. (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685).
104
Id. (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348
(2011)); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (noting
that, with class proceedings, “the virtues Congress originally saw in arbitration,
its speed and simplicity and inexpensiveness, would be shorn away and arbitration would wind up looking like the litigation it was meant to displace”).
97
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resolve disputes through classwide arbitration.’”105 Thus, like the
silence that was found insufficient in Stolt-Nielsen, ambiguity did
not provide a sufficient contractual basis for the Court to conclude
that the parties agreed to give up the benefits of individual arbitration and to permit class arbitration proceedings.106
The majority’s decision rests on the FAA’s preemption of the
California contract law.107 The California law at issue was based
on the doctrine of contra proferentem.108 The majority explained
that the rule was one of “last resort,” applied only once other forms
of interpretation were exhausted.109 In addition, the rule resolves
an ambiguity on the basis of public policy factors rather than the
parties’ intentions.110 Because the rule is used when a court cannot
determine the intentions of the parties, the Court reasoned that the
use of this doctrine to permit class arbitration is “inconsistent with
‘the foundational FAA principle that arbitration is a matter of consent.’”111 The Court also noted that it did not matter that the doctrine applied with equal force to all types of contracts as long as
the doctrine interfered with the fundamental attributes of arbitration and the purpose of the FAA.112 The FAA, the Court remarked,
provides the default rule for resolving contractual ambiguities in
arbitration agreements.113
Thus, the majority concluded that ambiguity in an arbitration
agreement does not constitute a sufficient contractual basis to find
consent to class arbitration and that the doctrine of contra
105

Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 685–

867).
106

See id. at 1416–17.
See id. at 1417–19.
108
Id. at 1417.
109
Id. (quoting 3 A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 559 at 268–70 (1960)).
110
Id.
111
See id. at 1418 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp.,
559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612,
1623 (2018) (“[C]ourts may not allow a [state] contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by mandating classwide arbitration procedures
without the parties’ consent.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333, 348 (2011) (“[C]lass arbitration, to the extent it is manufactured by [a state
law] rather than consen[t], is inconsistent with the FAA.”).
112
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1418.
113
Id. at 1419.
107
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proferentem could not be used as a substitute for an affirmative
contractual basis showing that the parties agreed to class proceedings.114
C.
The Concurring Opinion
In his concurrence, Justice Thomas agreed with the majority’s
application of FAA precedent, although he read the arbitration
agreement as silent and only contemplating bilateral arbitration.115
He wrote separately, however, to note his continued skepticism of
the Court’s implied preemption of state law where, as here, the
state law “‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.”116
D.

The Dissenting Opinions

1. JUSTICE GINSBURG
Although she joined Justice Kagan’s dissent in full, Justice
Ginsburg wrote separately to emphasize the Court’s divergence
from the FAA’s fundamental principle that “arbitration is a matter
of consent, not coercion.”117 Justice Ginsburg pointed out not only
that the intention was for the Act to serve a limited purpose but
also that it was not meant to be used for contracts where one party
has limited bargaining power, such as in consumer and employment contracts.118 She pointed out that the effect of the Court ap114

Id.
Id. at 1419–20 (Thomas, J., concurring).
116
Id. at 1420 (quoting id. at 1415 (majority opinion)); see also Wyeth v.
Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 587 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“My review of this
Court’s broad implied pre-emption precedents, particularly its ‘purposes and
objectives’ pre-emption jurisprudence, has increased my concerns that implied
pre-emption doctrines have not always been constitutionally applied. Under the
vague and ‘potentially boundless’ doctrine of ‘purposes and objectives’ preemption . . . the Court has pre-empted state law based on its interpretation of
broad federal policy objectives, legislative history, or generalized notions of
congressional purposes that are not contained within the text of federal law.”
(citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 907–08 (2000) (Stevens,
J., dissenting))).
117
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1420 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting StoltNielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 681 (2010)).
118
See id.
115
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plying the FAA to these contracts has been to impose mandatory
arbitration on employees and consumers with “no genuine choice
in the matter.”119 It also precluded these individuals from being
able to come together to seek remedies as a class.120 As a consequence, she noted, employees and consumers are faced with obstacles in obtaining relief, especially in circumstances where the situation “cries out for collective treatment” precisely because individual claims would be costly to bring, like in the present case.121
Justice Ginsburg called out the “irony of invoking ‘the first principle’ that ‘arbitration is strictly a matter of consent’ to justify imposing individual arbitration on employees who surely would not
choose to proceed solo,” and she concluded that immediate congressional action was necessary to correct the Court’s expansion of
the FAA.122
2. JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR
In her brief dissent, Justice Sotomayor asserted that the “Court
went wrong years ago in concluding that a ‘shift from bilateral arbitration to class-action arbitration’ imposes such ‘fundamental
changes’ that class-action arbitration ‘is not arbitration as envisioned by’” the FAA.123 She also disagreed with the Court’s
preemption of the state law and noted that the Court should not
have acted so hastily to preempt a “neutral principle of state con-

119

See id. at 1420–21.
See id. (“The Court has relied on the FAA . . . to deny to employees and
consumers ‘effective relief against powerful economic entities.’ Arbitration
clauses, the Court has decreed, may preclude judicial remedies even when submission to arbitration is made a take-it-or-leave-it condition of employment or is
imposed on a consumer given no genuine choice in the matter.” (quoting
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 476 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting))).
121
See id. at 1421.
122
Id. at 1421–22 (citation omitted) (quoting id. at 1415–16 (majority opinion)).
123
Id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (first quoting
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 686 (2010); and
then quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 351 (2011)).
120
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tract law” without making sure that the preemption was truly necessary.124
3. JUSTICE KAGAN
As one of the few Justices who viewed the agreement as clearly permitting class arbitration, Justice Kagan began her dissent by
focusing on specific phrases of the arbitration agreement at issue.125 In her view, the terms and phrases used in the agreement
were broad enough to cover both individual and class arbitration.126
However, Justice Kagan pointed out that, even if the Court was
correct about the contract’s ambiguity, applying the “plain-vanilla
rule of contract interpretation, applied in California as in every
other State,” should have yielded the simple result of permitting
class arbitration.127 In Justice Kagan’s view, the “anti-drafter canon” is exactly the kind of state contract rule that the FAA contemplates will control interpretations of arbitration clauses.128 She
highlighted previous decisions where the Court itself had pointed
out that the proper course was for the Court to apply state contract
principles except where they discriminated against arbitration
agreements.129 Where a state contract law treated arbitration
124
Id. at 1427–28 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This Court normally acts
with great solicitude when it comes to the possible pre-emption of state law, but
the majority today invades California contract law without pausing to address
whether its incursion is necessary. Such haste is as ill advised as the new federal
common law of arbitration contracts it has begotten.” (citation omitted)).
125
See id. at 1428–29 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
126
See id. For example, Justice Kagan construed the phrase “any and all
disputes, claims, or controversies” as “encompass[ing] both their individual and
their class variants.” Id. at 1428. The employee’s class arbitration was a “‘dispute, claim or controversy’ that belonged in arbitration.” Id. at 1429. Similarly,
the agreement stated that arbitration “shall be in lieu of any and all lawsuits or
other civil legal proceedings relating to [the employee’s] employment.” Id. Justice Kagan interpreted these phrases from the agreement as allowing arbitration
of any kind of action that could have been brought in court. See id. at 1428–29.
127
Id. at 1428.
128
See id. at 1430–31.
129
See id. (“[T]he construction of those contractual terms . . . is ‘a question
of state law, which this Court does not sit to review . . . .’ [e]xcept when state
contract law discriminates against arbitration agreements.” (quoting Volt Info.
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agreements worse off than other contracts, it would be preempted
because it would stand as an obstacle to achieving the FAA’s purpose of placing arbitration agreements on the same footing as all
other contracts.130 But in this case, Justice Kagan noted that the
anti-drafter rule is neutral, does not attempt to subtly target arbitration agreements, and applies and treats all conceivable contracts
the same.131
Justice Kagan concluded that the only basis for the majority’s
holding was its hostility towards class arbitration.132 It was only
because this case involved class arbitration, she argued, that the
majority ignored the parties’ contract and neutral default rule and
preempted the state law.133 Justice Kagan concluded that the Court
“should instead—as the FAA contemplates—have left the parties’
agreement, as construed by state law, alone.”134
III.

COMMENT ON THE LAMPS PLUS DECISION

A.

A Look at the Legislative History and the Court’s Hostility
Towards Class Arbitration
The Lamps Plus decision is an unfortunate continuation of the
Court’s hostility towards class arbitration that has been the basis
for many previous decisions.135 A majority of the Court has critiScis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 474
(1989))); see also Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009)
(“Neither [Section 2 nor Section 3 of the FAA] purports to alter background
principles of state contract law regarding the scope of agreements . . . .”).
130
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431 (Kagan, J., dissenting); see also Kindred
Nursing Ctrs. Ltd. v. Clark, 137 S. Ct. 1421, 1424 (2017) (“The Federal Arbitration Act . . . requires courts to place arbitration agreements ‘on equal footing
with all other contracts.’” (quoting DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463,
468 (2015))).
131
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The antidrafter rule . . . takes no side—favors no outcome—as between class and individualized dispute resolution.”).
132
See id. at 1435.
133
See id.
134
Id.
135
See id.; Imre S. Szalai, The Supreme Court’s Arbitration Docket, 3 AM.
CONST. SOC’Y SUP. CT. REV. 91, 111 (2019) [hereinafter Szalai, Arbitration
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cized class arbitration as fundamentally different from individualized arbitration136 and has painted a picture of class arbitration that
has allowed the Court to use the preemption doctrine wherever
possible to not permit class proceedings. According to the majority, class arbitration stands in stark contrast to the cheap, fast, and
personalized individual arbitration proceedings that the majority
believes the FAA was designed for.137 In the majority’s view, informality is the biggest advantage of arbitration, and that advantage must be preserved at all costs.138 To support these assertions, the majority has plucked from the sparse legislative history
some indication that members of Congress were aware of the possible financial and efficiency advantages of arbitration.139 This,
Docket] (“The Lamps Plus decision and the Court’s other class arbitration cases
are not really about arbitration at all; instead, these cases are best understood as
reflecting the desire of certain justices to dismantle class actions.”). For examples of this hostility toward class arbitration, see generally Epic Sys. Corp. v.
Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018), and AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S.
333 (2011).
136
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (“[I]t is important to recognize the
‘fundamental’ difference between class arbitration and the individualized form
of arbitration envisioned by the FAA.” (quoting Epic Sys. Corp., 138 S. Ct. at
1622–23)).
137
See id. (describing benefits of individualized arbitration as “lower costs,
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators to
resolve specialized disputes” (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010))). Some commentators have also noted that this
view of individual arbitration as efficient and less costly can also help explain
the Court’s hostility towards litigation, which is described as slow and inefficient. See, e.g., Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72
VAND. L. REV. 1119, 1141 (2019). This view is consistent with the Lamps Plus
Court’s portrayal of class arbitration as too litigation-like and the hostility of the
Court towards the procedure. See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416.
138
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416.
139
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2 (“It is practically appropriate that the action
should be taken at this time when there is so much agitation against the costliness and delays of litigation. These matters can be largely eliminated by agreements for arbitration, if arbitration agreements are made valid and enforceable.”); see also Bookman, supra note 137, at 1147–48 (“Relying on the FAA’s
legislative history, the Court often states that the FAA was intended ‘to allow
parties to avoid “the costliness and delays of litigation”’ because arbitration was
supposed to ‘largely eliminate[]’ that cost and delay. The Court has now held in
multiple contexts that this litigation-avoidance purpose prevails over Congress’s
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however, appears to be the only support from the legislative history
of the majority’s restrictive view of what arbitration is meant to
be.140
First, the legislative record and many commentators suggest
that Congress enacted the FAA for the limited purpose of pushing
back against the judicial hostility towards arbitration existing at the
time.141 The FAA was intended to fight against this hostility by
making arbitration agreements valid and enforceable and by placing them on the same footing as all other contracts.142 This means
that arbitration agreements were not meant to be elevated above
other contracts—they were simply meant to be treated and enforced equally.143 The Court, however, through decisions such as
Lamps Plus, has elevated arbitration agreements above other contracts.144 Through the use of the preemption doctrine, the Court has
intent in other statutes . . . to allow collective action and over many areas of state
law.” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (first quoting Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510–11 (1974); and then quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985))).
140
But see Imre S. Szalai, Aggregate Dispute Resolution: Class and Labor
Arbitration, 13 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 399, 425–39 (2008) (discussing how
there is nothing in legislative history indicating that Congress understood FAA
as supporting a framework for class arbitration).
141
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 1–2; Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note
135, at 106–07 (“The FAA was originally designed to be narrow in scope and
applicability . . . . [T]he FAA was designed with a simple goal in mind: to reverse prior judicial hostility against the enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration
clauses and to make such clauses as enforceable as other contract terms . . . .”).
142
H.R. REP. NO. 68-96 at 1–2; Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135,
at 107. Many commentators have also noted that the FAA was supposed to be
limited to claims involving parties of equal bargaining power, further raising
doubt as to the Court’s expansion of the FAA. See, e.g., Richard Frankel, The
Arbitration Clause as Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 540 n.40
(2014) [hereinafter Frankel, Super Contract].
143
See Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 107 (noting that the
drafters of the FAA did not want to make arbitration agreements more enforceable than other contracts); Wilson, supra note 22, at 100 (discussing that congressional intent behind FAA was to place arbitration agreements on same footing as
other contracts).
144
See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1146 (“The Court has described the
FAA as embodying ‘a national policy favoring arbitration’ that does not just put
arbitration contracts on equal footing with other kinds of contracts but seems to
affirmatively favor arbitration over litigation.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting
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singled out arbitration clauses for special treatment, setting them
apart from other contracts.145 For example, as a result of the Lamps
Plus decision, ambiguous arbitration agreements are not subject to
the contra proferentem rule like other contracts because of the
Court’s unwillingness to read the contract to permit class arbitration.146 Through such decisions, the Court has advanced a policy
favoring arbitration instead of treating it equally.147
Furthermore, although the majority is correct that there is evidence that the Congress that considered the FAA was aware of the
possible advantages of arbitration,148 the majority draws the wrong
conclusion from this evidence. The fact that Congress recognized
the potential benefits of arbitration does not mean they meant to
restrict parties to only those forms of arbitration that use those
benefits to the fullest.149 There is also little indication that the possible efficiency and cost advantages were intended to allow the
Court to block the class arbitration procedure, or any other procedural form of arbitration for that matter.150 The FAA itself is silent
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984))); see also Szalai, Arbitration
Docket, supra note 135, at 108 (“Today, arbitration agreements are more enforceable than other contracts and benefit from special preferences and rules
written not by Congress, but by the Court.”).
145
See Wilson, supra note 22, at 132–33 (arguing that FAA’s purpose of
placing arbitration agreements on “equal footing as other contracts” was frustrated after Concepcion excluded arbitration agreements from “a generally applicable state law”).
146
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1418 (2019); Hila Keren,
Divided and Conquered: The Neoliberal Roots and Emotional Consequences of
the Arbitration Revolution, 72 FLA. L. REV. 575, 598–99 (2020).
147
See Wilson, supra note 22, at 124–29 (discussing how the Court’s policy
favoring arbitration is inconsistent with legislative intent to place arbitration
agreements on equal footing with other contracts).
148
See H.R. REP. NO. 68-96, at 2.
149
See Wilson, supra note 22, at 134 n.209 (noting that while Congress recognized potential benefits stemming from arbitration, “the legislative history
does not support the conclusion that Congress envisioned any particular proceedings”).
150
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 360–61 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting); Wilson, supra note 22, at 133; see also S.I. STRONG,
CLASS, MASS, AND COLLECTIVE ARBITRATION IN NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 109 (2013) (noting that it is unclear whether the traditional model of bilateral arbitration is or has ever been true).
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on the particular procedural form that arbitration must take.151 This
silence has allowed arbitration to take on many different disputes
in many different procedural forms, not just the bilateral arbitration
form that the majority paints as the ideal picture of arbitration.152
And even if class arbitrations may be more lengthy and expensive
than individualized arbitration,153 that should not be a reason to
throw away a potentially useful procedural option. In his dissent in
AT&T Mobility, Justice Breyer correctly pointed out that instead of
comparing bilateral and class arbitration, we should be comparing
class arbitration and regular class actions.154 That argument is still
valid here. Using this comparison, class arbitration is the more
streamlined, efficient process as compared to class action litigation.155 Class arbitrations provide the same, as well as unique, benefits to the parties.156 The parties are still allowed to structure the
proceeding in their agreement, pick and choose which procedural
rules to follow, select a specialized arbitrator, and so on.157 Just
like individual arbitration, class arbitration can be made less formal

151

See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; see also Resnik, supra note 14, at 2890 (“The
FAA’s text . . . provided no descriptions of the form that arbitrations were to
have. The Court imputed one through a purposive interpretation, inflected with
assessments of the costs and benefits of class actions.”).
152
See Resnik, supra note 14, at 2892 (“The 1925 statute’s silence as to form
reflects its historical context, authorizing enforcement when the practice was
nascent and leaving ample room for arbitration’s evolution, in use today for a
range of disputes from high stakes, heavily lawyered, expensive commercial
conflicts to family dissolutions.”); Wilson, supra note 22, at 135–36 (discussing
how modern arbitration practices do not necessarily fit Court’s description of
inexpensive and streamlined arbitration). Some research also indicates that arbitration is not actually cheaper or more efficient than litigation. See Wilson, supra note 22, at 136 n.219.
153
See Gregory M. Bentz & Phillip Zeeck, Concerned About Class Arbitration? Check Your Agreement, NAT. L. REV. (June 28, 2019),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/concerned-about-class-arbitration-checkyour-agreement.
154
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 363 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
155
See id.; see also Neal Troum, The Problem with Class Arbitration, 38 VT.
L. REV. 419, 420 (2013).
156
See Troum, supra note 155, at 420, 427–28.
157
See id.
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compared to litigating a class action.158 Or, just like with individual
arbitration, parties can choose to forgo all of the “benefits” and
make their proceedings more formal.159 Unfortunately, the majority of the Court continues to incorrectly restrict arbitration to the
“efficient” bilateral form without much justification.160
In addition, in some circumstances, class arbitration proceedings may even be more efficient and streamlined than individualized arbitration.161 These are usually circumstances where there are
large numbers of potential claimants with a common injury.162
Companies and employers that seek to dismiss class actions usually hope and believe that most consumers or employees will abandon their claims—for example, because of financial reasons—
thereby decreasing the number of arbitrations they have to defend.163 Recently, however, there have been circumstances where
potential class members and their attorneys have refused to abandon their claims and fought back against employers that demanded

158

See id.
See id. at 427–28 (“Parties can choose a specialist to be their arbitrator,
but they need not; they may want privacy, but they may also seek celebrity . . . . [F]ormality may be desired in some arbitration contexts, or not; and it is
not uncommon for litigants to make strategic decisions that will cause a case to
move more quickly (or slowly) when it is in their interest.”).
160
See Keren, supra note 146, at 594 (arguing that, in Stolt-Nielsen, Justice
Alito failed to provide any supporting authority for his assertion that “classaction arbitration changes the nature of arbitration” and that there are great differences between the procedures (citing Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l
Corp, 559 U.S. 662, 685–87 (2010))).
161
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 363 (2011)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[A] single class proceeding is surely more efficient
than thousands of separate proceedings for identical claims. Thus, if speedy
resolution of disputes were all that mattered, then the [state] rule would reinforce, not obstruct, that objective of the Act.”); Bookman, supra note 137, at
1153 (“If efficiency is the goal, class arbitration can be more efficient than individualized arbitration in contexts that are likely to generate large numbers of
claims.”).
162
See Maureen A. Weston, Universes Colliding: The Constitutional Implications of Arbitral Class Actions, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1711, 1726–27
(2006) [hereinafter Weston, Universes Colliding].
163
See Cynthia Estlund, The Black Hole of Mandatory Arbitration, 96 N.C.
L. REV. 679, 695 (2018).
159
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individual arbitration.164 For example, Uber and Lyft have recently
found themselves overwhelmed with arbitration costs and fees
when thousands of their employees filed individual arbitration petitions after their class actions were dismissed in court.165 Now,
these companies are facing thousands of potential individual arbitration claims instead of one consolidated claim, with the employees already seeking a court order to compel the companies to pay
the arbitration fees so that the cases may proceed.166 And this is not
the first example of employees seeking to force their employer’s
hand or of employers realizing individual arbitration can prove to
be a costly endeavor.167 In such cases, the majority’s argument that
164

See, e.g., Jessica Goodheart, Why 24 Hour Fitness Is Going to the Mat
Against
Its
Own
Employees,
FAST CO.
(Mar.
13,
2018),
https://www.fastcompany.com/40543580/why-24-hour-fitness-is-going-to-themat-against-its-own-employees; Alison Frankel, ‘This Hypocrisy Will Not Be
Blessed’: Judge Orders DoorDash to Arbitrate 5,000 Couriers’ Claims,
REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Feb. 11, 2020, 5:53 PM), https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-otc-doordash/this-hypocrisy-will-not-be-blessed-judge-ordersdoordash-to-arbitrate-5000-couriers-claims-idUSKBN2052S1.
165
See Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might
Have Come up the Loser, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2019, 10:22 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-arbitration-miscalculation20190508-story.html (discussing how more than 60,000 employee drivers have
filed arbitration demands against Uber in the United States and estimating that it
will cost Uber $600 million to deal with these cases); Charlotte Garden, Uber
and Lyft Drivers Turn the Tables on Individual Arbitration, ONLABOR (Jan. 8,
2019),
https://onlabor.org/uber-and-lyft-drivers-turn-the-tables-on-individualarbitration/.
166
See Alison Frankel, Forced into Arbitration, 12,500 Drivers Claim Uber
Won’t Pay Fees to Launch Cases, REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Dec. 6, 2018, 2:58
PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-uber/forced-into-arbitration12500-drivers-claim-uber-wont-pay-fees-to-launch-cases-idUSKBN1O52C6.
167
See, e.g., Alison Frankel, From the 11th Circuit, a Cautionary Tale for
Employers Imposing Arbitration on Workers, REUTERS: ON THE CASE (Aug. 9,
2018, 4:14 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-otc-epic/from-the-11thcircuit-a-cautionary-tale-for-employers-imposing-arbitration-on-workersidUSKBN1KU2GF (discussing Hernandez v. Acosta Tractors Inc., 898 F. 3d
1301 (11th Cir. 2018), a case where an employer faced more than $100,000 in
arbitration fees after successfully dismissing a class action suit); Daniel
Wiessner, Arbitration Bid by 10,000 Postmates Drivers Not a ‘De Facto Class
Action’ – Judge, REUTERS LEGAL (Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/
article/employment-postmates/arbitration-bid-by-10000-postmates-drivers-not-a
-de-facto-class-action-judge-idUSL1N2C41ZD.
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bilateral arbitration is more cost effective and streamlined falls
apart. So why are class arbitrations not allowed to be part of the
efficient and streamlined procedures that the FAA apparently envisioned? Why are 1,300 potential arbitration proceedings by the
Lamps Plus’s employees more “efficient” than one class action?
Perhaps it is the Court’s way of limiting all types of class proceedings168 or is simply a result of the Court’s pro-business approach.169 Either way, these examples demonstrate the inconsistency of the Court’s assertion that class arbitration is always the more
inefficient option.170 Unfortunately, the Court’s decisions “cataloging . . . class arbitration’s many sins”171 have led to a vision of
class arbitration that is unmanageable and highly inefficient. This
approach, however, ignores the potential usefulness of class proceedings for certain disputes where, as in Lamps Plus, the particular circumstances “cr[y] out for collective treatment.”172
The majority also argues that arbitration is not designed for
class proceedings,173 but this argument is questionable as well.
Class arbitrations have, and hopefully will, continue to occur in the
United States, demonstrating the ability and utilization of the procedure to solve certain disputes.174 In addition, arbitral tribunals
168

See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1435 (2019) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting).
169
See generally Keren, supra note 146 (discussing effect of neoliberalism
and resulting pro-corporation arbitration jurisprudence).
170
See David Horton, Clause Construction: A Glimpse into Judicial and
Arbitral Decision-Making, 68 DUKE L. J. 1323, 1370–71 (2019) [hereinafter
Horton, Clause Construction] (“[Some] judges have observed that class actions
are a mere procedural device that leaves the ‘parties’ legal rights and duties
intact and the rules of decision unchanged.’ These courts have therefore held
that ‘the shift from multiple bilateral arbitrations to a single class arbitration
does nothing to alter a defendant’s potential aggregate liability.’” (footnote
omitted) (first quoting Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins.,
559 U.S. 393, 408 (2010); and then quoting Sandquist v. Lebo Auto., Inc. 376
P.3d 506, 520 (Cal. 2016))).
171
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1435 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
172
See id. at 1421 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); infra Section III.C.
173
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416.
174
See Class Action Case Docket, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://apps.adr.org/
CaseDocketApp/faces/CaseSearchPage.jsf;jsessionid=kspaG_Y5HGaIeks5ZOt
yNeJ90GrKPpPQjAYV6DE7dR7lZrxFp3is!1032178906 (last visited Nov. 18,
2020).
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have been utilized to deal with different forms of multiparty arbitration, showing that arbitration can adapt and handle different
kinds of disputes.175 Furthermore, many standard arbitration rules
contain specific rules for class arbitration proceedings, which raise
doubt as to the argument that arbitration cannot be designed and
structured to support a class proceeding.176 The majority does raise
a valid point as to the due process concerns in regard to class arbitration and absent members.177 Similarly, some commentators have
argued that class actions are inherently incompatible with arbitration proceedings because they seem to have a “preclusive effect on
absent . . . class members,” which is incompatible with the notion
that arbitrators possess only the authority granted to them by the
parties in the dispute.178 However, these due process concerns may
be better addressed through changes to the class arbitration procedure, not by placing more obstacles in the way of class arbitration
in the first place. For example, greater notice requirements or
changes to the institutional rules,179 such as establishing uniform
class arbitration rules or guidelines, may be better at addressing the
175

See STRONG, supra note 150, at 110, 167–68 (noting that arbitration
community has been conducting multiparty proceedings for some time and that
large-scale proceedings resemble traditional multiparty actions). See also id. at
167 (“[C]laims that class, mass, and collective arbitration are in some way fundamentally different from other forms of arbitration are unfounded, factually
and legally.”).
176
See, e.g., AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/Supplementary_
Rules_for_Class_Arbitrations.pdf.
177
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416 (“[C]lass arbitration . . . raises serious
due process concerns by adjudicating the rights of absent members of the plaintiff class . . . with only limited judicial review.”).
178
See Troum, supra note 155, at 421.
179
For example, after the Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial
Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444 (2003), the American Arbitration Association
established rules dictating that “clause construction” awards, which were issued
by an arbitrator deciding whether a silent arbitration agreement permitted class
proceedings, were to be published and contain a written reasoning of the decision. See AAA Policy on Class Arbitrations, AM. ARB. ASS’N, (July 14, 2005)
https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/document_repository/AAA-Policy-onClass-Arbitrations.pdf; AM. ARB. ASS’N, SUPPLEMENTARY RULES FOR CLASS
ARBITRATIONS Rule 3 (2003), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/
Supplementary_Rules_for_Class_Arbitrations.pdf.
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due process concerns.180 With equally valid concerns on both sides
of this issue, congressional action is necessary to address this specific issue. Modifying the procedural requirements may be the only
way to both protect absent class members and preserve the class
arbitration procedure, which is something that Congress could accomplish with an FAA amendment or a separate statute.
The consequences of the Lamps Plus decision, however, are
not limited to just denying class proceedings to this group of employees or just continuing the Court’s flawed class arbitration jurisprudence. As the next Section discusses, the majority, without
any real consideration about the necessity of such preemption,181
preempted a neutral state law for the sole purpose of not backing
down on class arbitration.
B.
Preemption of contra proferentem
Lamps Plus could have been a very straightforward decision.
The Court could have agreed with the concurrence’s reading of the
agreement and held that the agreement only permitted individual
arbitration.182 Or the Court could have read the arbitration clause
as unambiguously permitting class arbitration, as the dissent did.183
Under either reading, the result would have then been clear under
the reasoning of Stolt-Nielsen.184 The Court, instead, chose to
180

See generally Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1732–42
(discussing different approaches used in class arbitration in the United States).
181
In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor points out the Court reaches its conclusion without actually deciding for itself that the agreement is ambiguous. Lamps
Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The majority could have
avoided preemption by reading the contract as unambiguous like the concurrence did. See id. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring). Nevertheless, even while
deferring to the lower court’s reading, the Court should have paused before
preempting a state law and encroaching on the state law domain. Id. at 1428
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Kristopher Kleiner, Comment, AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion: The Disappearance of the Presumption Against
Preemption in the Context of the FAA, 89 DENV. U. L. REV. 747, 769 (2012)
(arguing that FAA preemption doctrine “deviates from the fundamental principles of federalism”).
182
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1419 (Thomas, J., concurring).
183
See id. at 1428–29 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
184
See Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 687
(2010).
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adopt the lower court’s interpretation of the agreement as ambiguous.185 As Justice Kagan argued, the conclusion still should have
been straightforward—apply the state contract law principle of
contra proferentem.186 Doing so would certainly have been consistent with the general presumption against preemption of state
laws.187 It would also have been consistent with Stolt-Nielsen,
where the Court did not explicitly say that express authorization
was required to permit class arbitration.188 Had the Court followed
the state rule and adopted the reading of the employee, class arbitration would have been permitted.189 The majority, however,
chose to go down a much different route and once again invoked
the preemption doctrine.190
The Lamps Plus majority’s preemption of the neutral state contract principle of contra proferentem191 is perhaps the most concerning part of this decision. The anti-drafter rule is applied to an
ambiguous contract as a “last resort,” where other rules of interpretation have failed to extract the meaning of the contract.192 It is
only applied where an ambiguity exists and only “[a]fter the court
has examined all of the other factors that affect the search for the
parties’ intended meaning, including general, local, technical and
trade usages and custom, and including the evidence of relevant
circumstances which must be admitted and weighed.”193 This rule
185

Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415.
See id. at 1430 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
187
Some commentators have argued that Court’s FAA preemption doctrine
interferes with state laws and is inconsistent with general presumption against
preemption. See, e.g., Kleiner, supra note 181, at 760–66.
188
See Stolt-Nielsen, 559 U.S. at 687 n.10.
189
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1430 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
190
See id. at 1417–19 (majority opinion).
191
See id.
192
5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M.
Perillo, ed. 1998) [hereinafter CORBIN]. But see David Horton, Flipping the
Script: Contra Proferentem and Standard Form Contracts, 80 U. COLO. L. REV.
431, 436 (2009) [hereinafter Horton, Flipping the Script] (“Historically, contra
proferentem had been a last resort . . . . However, the version that governed
standard-form contracts was markedly different. Rather than being the last step
of the interpretive process, it was the first. Rather than being a tie-breaker, it was
dispositive.” (footnote omitted)).
193
CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27.
186
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dictates that a court reasonably interpret the ambiguous terms
against the party who supplied or drafted them.194 The language is
interpreted against the drafter because the drafter, more so than
other parties, knows of any ambiguities and usually benefits from
the ambiguous language.195
The Court’s preemption of this doctrine is both intriguing and
worrying. There is arguably good reason and basis to preempt state
contract rules that explicitly or subtly discriminate or single out
arbitration contracts.196 These rules, as the Court asserts, undermine the purpose of the FAA and legislative intent to ensure that
arbitration agreements are enforceable and placed on the same
footing as all other contracts.197 However, based on section 2 of the
FAA, there is also a good basis for the Court to leave alone state

194
See id.; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 (AM. L.
INST. 1981) (“In choosing among the reasonable meanings of a promise or
agreement or a term thereof, that meaning is generally preferred which operates
against the party who supplies the words or from whom a writing otherwise
proceeds.”).
195
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 206 cmt. a. The Supreme
Court itself has recognized the contra proferentem rule in Mastrobuono v.
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52 (1995), which also involved an
arbitration agreement. See also id. at 62–63 (“Moreover, respondents cannot
overcome the common-law rule of contract interpretation that a court should
construe ambiguous language against the interest of the party that drafted
it. Respondents drafted an ambiguous document, and they cannot now claim the
benefit of the doubt. The reason for this rule is to protect the party who did not
choose the language from an unintended or unfair result. That rationale is well
suited to the facts of this case. As a practical matter, it seems unlikely that petitioners were actually aware of New York’s bifurcated approach to punitive
damages, or that they had any idea that by signing a standard-form agreement to
arbitrate disputes they might be giving up an important substantive right. In the
face of such doubt, we are unwilling to impute this intent to petitioners.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
196
See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64
(discussing FAA’s preemptive power based on the Commerce Clause); Shane
Blank, Note, Concerning Preemption: Upholding Consent Under the Federal
Arbitration Act, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 281, 284–85 (2012).
197
See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011);
see also Kleiner, supra note 181, at 748–52 (discussing preemption doctrine and
FAA).
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law rules that apply equally to all contracts and do not favor or
disfavor arbitration agreements.198
Contra proferentem is one such state contract principle. The
principle applies equally and uniformly to all sorts of contracts
where an ambiguity exists in the language and the court cannot
ascertain the intent of the parties any other way.199 The rule also
does not in any way discriminate against or target, expressly or
subtly, arbitration agreements as compared to other contracts.200
For example, unlike in Concepcion, where a class action waiver
ban would have applied more broadly to arbitration agreements as
opposed to other contracts,201 the anti-drafter rule does not lean
one way or the other.202 Additionally, the anti-drafter rule does not
presuppose any single outcome—certainly not the outcome that
class arbitration will always be allowed.203 As noted by Justice
Kagan in her dissent, had the employee drafted the contract, the
rule would have directed the Court to interpret the agreement
against the employee, thus preventing class arbitration.204 Al198

See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1415 (2019) (“The FAA
requires courts to ‘enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.’ Although courts may ordinarily accomplish that end by relying on state contract
principles, state law is preempted to the extent it ‘stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.”
(citations omitted) (first quoting Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1621
(2018); and then quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 352)); see also id. at 1431
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Nothing in the FAA . . . ‘purports to alter background
principles of state contract law regarding’ the scope or content of agreements.”
(quoting Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 556 U.S. 624, 630 (2009))).
199
See CORBIN, supra note 192 § 24.27; see also Jeffrey Gordon & Paul
Sullivan, Contra Proferentem Doesn’t Always Mean ‘Against the Insurer’, JD
SUPRA (July 21, 2016), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/contra-proferentemdoesn-t-always-mean-89102/.
200
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1431–32 (Kagan, J., dissenting); Sandquist
v. Lebo Auto., Inc., 376 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2016).
201
See 563 U.S. at 341. But see Wilson, supra note 22, at 137 (arguing that
Discover Bank rule was a “generally applicable state law” and that it did not
“target arbitration”).
202
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1432 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
203
Id.
204
Id.; cf. id. at 1432 n.5 (“Similarly, if Lamps Plus, as the agreement’s author, had wanted class arbitration (perhaps because that would resolve many
related cases at once) and Varela had resisted it (perhaps because he thought his
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though that would be an unlikely scenario, it nevertheless shows
that the rule neither discriminates nor favors arbitration.205 It is
curious, then, that the Court so hastily preempted such a neutral
and widely used state contract rule that seems to agree with both
section 2 of the FAA and the Court’s previous precedent.206 One of
the dissenters offers perhaps the only good reason for the majority’s preemption––namely, that this case involved class arbitration
and that the Court is willing to preempt even a neutral state law to
prevent a class proceeding.207 The majority justifies its preemption
by pointing out that the rule uses public policy factors to resolve
ambiguities in contracts, instead of focusing on the parties’ intent.208 Even so, the rule is potentially useful in interpreting some
agreements where the court can draw a reasonable interpretation of
the agreement and where an actual ambiguity exists.209 By sidecase better than the others), the anti-drafter rule would have prevented, rather
than permitted, class arbitration.”).
205
See id.
206
See id. at 1432 (“[The] Court has itself used the anti-drafter canon to
interpret an arbitration agreement. In that case . . . the rule’s through-andthrough neutrality made preemption unthinkable.”); Weston, The Accidental
Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 60 (discussing how FAA explicitly contemplates laws of general applicability that include state contract law defenses).
207
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1428 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The majority can
reach the opposite conclusion only by insisting that the FAA trumps that neutral
state rule whenever its application would result in class arbitration.”); see also
Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 63 (noting that
“significant judicial vacatur” of arbitration awards occurs in the form of preemption of state laws that are “deemed rarely in direct conflict with arbitration, but
merely ‘anti-arbitration’”).
208
Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417; see also CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27
(“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its application does not
assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the words, or even
the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the language used.
It is chiefly a rule of policy, generally favoring the underdog. It directs the court
to choose between two or more possible reasonable meanings on the basis of
their legal operation, i.e., whether they favor the drafter or the other party.
As . . . Restatement (Second) of Contracts comment [a] on [Section 206] entitled
‘Interpretation Against the Draftsman’ explains, ‘It is in strictness a rule of legal
effect, sometimes called construction, as well as interpretation; its operation
depends on the position of the parties as they appear in litigation . . . .’”).
209
See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 555 (“Although some
authorities have said that the doctrine should be used as a ‘last resort’ when
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stepping the rule, the Court merely ignores the parties’ agreement
for its own policy preference against class arbitrations.210
It is unfortunate that the majority would so readily substitute its
policy judgment for a long-standing contract principle. As noted by
Justice Kagan in her dissent, “[f]rom an ex ante perspective, the
[contra proferentem] rule encourages the drafter to set out its intent
in clear contractual language, for the other party then to see and
agree to.”211 In other words, maintaining the applicability of the
anti-drafter rule to arbitration agreements would encourage employers and businesses to be clear in their drafting.212 This would
likely result in drafters inserting explicit class arbitration waivers
to prevent being forced to submit to class proceedings.213 And
while this would, of course, conclusively prohibit employees and
consumers from initiating class proceedings, at the very least, these
parties would be better informed about what rights they have prior
to signing the contracts.214 There is no good reason for imposing
on these parties the burden of having to realize that, even in the
absence of an explicit class action waiver, they are nevertheless
prohibited from pursuing class arbitration.215 The explicit class
waivers would place employees and consumers on notice that they
are in fact waiving these rights, instead of leaving parties uncertain
about their options or how a court will later interpret the contract.216 In fact, this knowledge may indeed impact their decision to
extrinsic evidence fails to resolve the ambiguity, extrinsic evidence is often unavailable in arbitration disputes, and the doctrine has been frequently applied to
standard-form contracts of all types.” (footnotes omitted)).
210
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1435 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
211
Id. at 1434.
212
See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 555 (discussing how one
of the main justifications of contra proferentem is that it “encourages greater
clarity in contracts through better drafting”).
213
See Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note 192, at 437 (noting that contra proferentem rule encourages “information flow by making the drafter spell
out the parties’ rights and duties or suffer dire consequences”).
214
See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 560.
215
See id. at 560–61.
216
See id. (“There appears to be some evidence, particularly in the consumer
context, that companies intentionally make their arbitration clauses difficult to
understand so that consumers will not fully realize what rights they are giving
up.”).
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enter into the contract in the first place.217 The Court’s holding,
however, allows employers and businesses to leave their contracts
ambiguous with no fear of being dragged into a class proceeding.218 Even with no explicit class waiver, the mere absence of express authorization of class arbitration is enough to block employees and consumers from engaging in class proceedings.219 The
Lamps Plus decision places the burden on the employees and consumers to realize that the ambiguous contract will preclude them
from seeking relief in a class proceeding, something that employees and consumers should not be expected to do.220
Furthermore, as Justice Kagan points out, “from an ex post perspective, the rule enables an interpreter to resolve any remaining
uncertainty in line with the parties’ likely expectations.”221 As
mentioned, an employee signing the contract, seeing no class action waiver, likely does not expect that he would be barred from
participating in a class proceeding.222 The employer, on the other
hand, likely knew of the possibility of inserting a class action
waiver, and still chose to proceed without one.223 A simple application of the contra proferentem rule would warrant protecting the
employee from the employer’s omission of the waiver, as the em-

217

See id.
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019).
219
See id.
220
See id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Where, as here, an employment agreement provides for arbitration as a forum for all disputes relating to a
person’s employment and the rules of that forum allow for class actions, an employee who signs an arbitration agreement should not be expected to realize that
she is giving up access to that procedural device.”).
221
Id. at 1434 (Kagan, J., dissenting). But see CORBIN, supra note 192,
§ 24.27 (“The rule is not actually one of interpretation, because its application
does not assist in determining the meaning that the two parties gave to the
words, or even the meaning that a reasonable person would have assigned to the
language used.”).
222
See Frankel, Super Contract, supra note 142, at 560–61.
223
See Horton, Flipping the Script, supra note 192, at 437–38 (explaining
that firms can use ambiguity in contracts strategically and how contra
proferentem helps combat these “opportunistic incentives”).
218
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ployee likely had no power or opportunity to negotiate to change
the agreement.224
The Lamps Plus Court took yet another step towards expanding
the FAA’s preemptive powers. The question that remains is what
state rules will the Court preempt next? One commentator has suggested that the Court might seek to preempt procedural devices
such as punitive damages or discovery.225 These procedural devices, however, were likely already in danger of being undermined
even before the Lamps Plus decision under the reasoning of Concepcion.226 Consider, for example, a state law mandating discovery
procedures similar to the ones used in federal district courts. They
will likely be seen as too litigation-like for the Court, imposing
procedural requirements on the arbitrators and the parties that are
inconsistent with streamlined arbitration procedures—much like
the class arbitration the Court was trying to prevent in Lamps
Plus.227 The Court could also, although unlikely, see such discovery as entirely consistent with private dispute resolution, reasoning
that the parties likely intended to submit themselves to discovery in
order to fully arbitrate their claims. It will be interesting to see how

224
See CORBIN, supra note 192 § 24.27 (“The ‘contra proferentem’ device is
intended to aid a party whose bargaining power was less than that of the draftsperson.”); see also Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of
Contracts, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 833, 854 (1964) (“[The contra proferentem rule]
favors the party of lesser bargaining power, who has little or no opportunity to
choose the terms of the contract, and perforce accepts one drawn by the stronger
party.”).
225
See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1184 (“Lamps Plus leaves [an] open
question[] about . . . what other ‘fundamental attributes’ of arbitration will next
be held to trump ‘plain vanilla’ state contract law. Punitive damages and discovery seem like potential contenders for features which, if used in arbitration,
might be challenged as undermining the ‘essential virtues’ of arbitration.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1428–35 (Kagan, J., dissenting))).
226
See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 341–42 (2011)
(discussing examples of state laws that would be preempted because they would
disfavor arbitration, such as, for example, one finding agreements unconscionable that failed to provide for “judicially monitored discovery”).
227
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1416.
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courts will apply the Lamps Plus decision to such procedures in the
future.228
As mentioned, however, state laws involving things such as
discovery procedures and punitive damages were probably already
at risk before Lamps Plus under the reasoning of Concepcion and
other related cases.229 More of a concern are other neutral contract
principles, like contra proferentem, which previously seemed to be
applicable to all arbitration agreements under the saving clause of
section 2.230 These rules are unlike those addressed in, for example, Concepcion, where the state law at issue would have more
broadly impacted arbitration agreements.231 They were not designed with an ulterior motive or policy aimed at limiting or controlling arbitration agreements.232 Instead, neutral state contract
rules are applied by courts to help interpret disputed contracts.233
The Lamps Plus decision shows that the Court is willing to reason
its way around these state rules to accomplish its policy goal of
cutting back on class proceedings. If the Court can preempt the
anti-drafter rule, what other basic rules of interpretation will see
228

See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64 n.29
(discussing examples of laws of general applicability that were preempted because they affected arbitration).
229
See Christopher R. Drahozal, FAA Preemption After Concepcion, 35
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 153, 165 (2014) (discussing how, after Concepcion, “any state contract law defense that conditions enforcement of an arbitration clause on some procedure that makes arbitration ‘more formal, costlier, or
less efficient’ is preempted,” such as, for example, court-monitored discovery
(quoting Arpan A. Sura & Robert A DeRise, Conceptualizing Conception: The
Continuing Viability of Arbitration Regulations, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 403, 449
(2013))).
230
See Wilson, supra note 22, at 107 (“The savings clause of section 2 promotes the congressional purpose behind the FAA . . . because the savings clause
ensures that, like other contracts, arbitration agreements are subject to all generally applicable contract defenses.”).
231
See supra note 201.
232
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1415 (“[S]tate law is preempted to the extent it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives’ of the FAA.” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011))).
233
See, e.g., CORBIN, supra note 192, § 24.27 (explaining how courts will
use neutral state contract rule of contra proferentem to decide what meaning to
give to a contract’s words).
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themselves thrown out whenever class proceedings are at issue?
Taking the FAA preemption doctrine to its extreme, could the
Court not preempt basic rules, such as construing undefined terms
according to industry custom or their common, ordinary meaning if
such a rule would result in the authorization of class arbitration?234
The only limit that can be extracted from the majority’s opinion is
that the majority considered contra proferentem to be applying
public policy factors and not actually interpreting the parties’ intent.235 Perhaps this is one way that other neutral rules will be upheld as applicable—if they are seen as actual rules of interpretation. The extent to which the Court is willing to go to prevent class
arbitration is yet to be seen. In the meantime, the Court’s decision
leaves all contracting parties in an uneasy limbo by making it less
predictable as to which contract principles will apply to their
agreements and which will be preempted.236 At the very least,
businesses and employers can rest easy knowing that the Court will
continue to expand the FAA to protect them from class arbitrations.237
C.
Future Impact of Lamps Plus
Lamps Plus expands the Stolt-Nielsen decision by placing further requirements and restrictions on arbitration agreements and
the parties that enter into them. Arbitration agreements will now
require explicit authorization of class arbitration for a court to find
that a party to the contract may pursue a claim through class proceedings.238 Nothing short of actual consent will allow parties to
pursue class arbitration.
234

See id. § 24.13.
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417 (“[C]ontra proferentem resolves the
ambiguity against the drafter based on public policy factors, primarily equitable
consideration about the parties’ relative bargaining strength.”).
236
See Bookman, supra note 137, at 1160 (“Lamps Plus undermines parties’
expectations that general contract principles apply to arbitration contracts and
replaces those principles with a federal common law of arbitration contracts.”).
But see Kleiner, supra note 181, at 759–60 (explaining how a consistent line of
“FAA preemption jurisprudence” provides businesses with more predictability
and allows for easier drafting of agreements for multiple states).
237
See generally Keren, supra note 146.
238
See Lamps Plus, 139 S. Ct. at 1417.
235
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While this result is in line with the Court’s various holdings,239
it will nonetheless have drastic consequences for the rights of employees and consumers.240 Some commentators have previously
accused the Court of taking a pro-business stance on this issue,
blocking class arbitration to protect the expectations of businesses
and employers.241 The Lamps Plus decision is simply a continuation of this stance. Because of this decision, many employees and
consumers will not have access to class proceedings to vindicate
small claims against employers and businesses, even where there is
no explicit class arbitration waiver in the agreement.242 This is
troublesome because class proceedings are often the only realistic
way for individuals with small claims to seek relief. 243 Class actions are useful procedural devices where a large group of claim-

239
See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662,
687 (2010).
240
Some commentators have asserted that the FAA was not supposed to
apply to employment or consumer contracts, marking yet another area of expansion of the statute beyond what Congress intended. See Szalai, Arbitration
Docket, supra note 135, at 108–09; Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal
Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History, 2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 117–18
(2016) (“The history of the FAA’s enactment helps demonstrate that the FAA
was originally intended to provide a framework for federal courts to support a
limited, modest system of private dispute resolution for commercial disputes,
not the expansive system that exists today involving both state and federal courts
and covering virtually all types of non-criminal disputes . . . . Through my historical research, I learned the statute was enacted to cover privately-negotiated
arbitration agreements between merchants in order to facilitate the resolution of
contractual disputes . . . . However, through decades of flawed interpretations,
the Supreme Court has expanded the statute to force both state courts and federal courts to acknowledge and compel arbitration of a wide variety of disputes,
including complex statutory disputes of a public nature, consumer disputes, and
employment disputes. Based on the history of the FAA’s enactment, it is clear
that the statute was never intended to apply in state courts or cover employment
disputes.”).
241
See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class Arbitration After Concepcion?, 60 KAN. L. REV. 767, 780–81 n.99 (2012) [hereinafter Weston, Death
of Class Arbitration] (noting that businesses praised Concepcion decision).
242
See generally Keren, supra note 146 (discussing how Lamps Plus decision will further isolate employees by restricting their ability to proceed collectively).
243
See Estlund, supra note 163, at 695.
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ants has suffered some common injury.244 Through a class proceeding, these claimants can aggregate their claims and split the
expenses of seeking relief.245 Without this procedural option, many
individuals are simply unable to bring their claims due to the expenses associated with individual arbitration.246 This results in the
loss of these individuals’ ability to seek relief and thus effectively
takes away their right to seek justice.247 In addition, class arbitration has more potential to fix the behavior that is harming the employees and consumers than a few individual claims, especially
where most individuals with small claims have no financial incentive or ability to bring them.248 Where employers and businesses
can insert class arbitration waivers—or, after Lamps Plus, simply
rely on ambiguous arbitration agreements—these arbitration clauses begin to look like exculpatory clauses, limiting the businesses’
liability.249
244

See Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1726–27.
See id.; Estlund, supra note 163, at 695.
246
Estlund, supra note 163, at 695 (“The problem for employees is that some
legal claims cannot practicably be adjudicated on an individual basis. In particular, many FLSA wage and house claims involve incremental pay disparities over
a few years; the cost of litigating them as an individual often exceeds the expected returns. But if many individuals are subject to the same challenged practice, as is often true, employees can practicably pursue their claims through a
class or collective action.” (footnote omitted)).
247
See id. (“If employers have their way in the Supreme Court, they will be
free to block . . . [class] actions, and to virtually nullify a large category of employee claims that are not viable on an individual basis, simply by requiring
individual arbitration.”); Keren, supra note 146, at 584 (noting that prohibiting
class arbitration “insulate[s] corporations from legal liability by preventing
claimants from coming together—which is by and large their only viable path to
redress”).
248
See Keren, supra note 146, at 586 (discussing effect of class waivers is to
prevent individuals from addressing “corporate wrongdoing”); see also id. at
592 (discussing Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as creating “a world in which as
long as [corporations] cause smaller harms to numerous victims, no one will be
able to hold them accountable”).
249
See Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 92 (“With this expansive system of arbitration currently in place and the willingness of courts to
compel arbitration where meaningful consent is lacking, corporate America and
parties with disproportionate bargaining power can unilaterally and easily remove themselves from the traditional justice system through the use of arbitration clauses. The average person in America has lost access to the courthouse,
245
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Furthermore, while class arbitration survives where it is expressly authorized by an arbitration agreement, there is little hope
that employees or consumers will have access to this procedural
option unless the employer or business drafting the contract permits class arbitration.250 Employees and consumers will now have
to negotiate for the inclusion of an explicit class arbitration authorization in the arbitration agreement. This, of course, is very unlikely to happen in either the employment or consumer context, where
arbitration clauses in contracts are usually of a take-it-or-leave-it
nature.251 Employees, especially, are placed in a tough spot where
the decision is between employment (with a binding arbitration
clause that may preclude them from seeking relief in a class proceeding) and unemployment.252 And while employees may be in a
better position than consumers to negotiate the contract terms,
most employees likely lack the necessary bargaining power or leverage to convince their employer to change the agreement to include a class arbitration procedure.253 Therefore, few employees, if

and in its place, a virtually unregulated, unreviewable, expansive system of privatized justice now exists.”); Estlund, supra note 163, at 703 (“[T]he imposition
of mandatory arbitration means that the employer faces only a miniscule chance
of ever confronting a formal legal claim in any forum regarding future legal
misconduct against its employees . . . . [S]uch a provision virtually amounts to
an ex ante exculpatory clause, and an ex ante waiver of substantive rights that
the law declares non-waivable.”).
250
See Keren, supra note 146, at 598 (arguing that there is “zero probability”
that corporations will ever explicitly agree to class arbitration).
251
See Horton, Clause Construction, supra note 170, at 1370 (“Class actions
invariably arise from adhesive consumer and employment contracts. In this milieu, there is no course of dealing . . . to analyze, and few plaintiffs will have
even read or understood the disputed term. Therefore, as one arbitrator put it, the
idea that the parties shared a common understanding of whether the agreement
authorized class arbitration ‘is actually a fiction.’”). There has also been a bit of
discussion about whether the FAA was intended to apply to such take-it-orleave-it contracts, further undermining the Court’s assertion that the parties to
such contracts consent to waive their rights to class proceedings. See supra note
240.
252
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1421 (2019) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting) (discussing employee’s “Hobson’s choice” in deciding whether to
accept an employment contract with an arbitration clause).
253
See Resnik, supra note 14, at 2863–70.
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any, will be able to secure the explicit class arbitration authorization required by the Court in Lamps Plus.
Fortunately, some hope remains for class arbitrations as some
federal courts have distinguished Lamps Plus and permitted class
proceedings. For example, in Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., the
Second Circuit upheld an arbitrator’s determination that the
agreement at issue permitted class proceedings and that absent
class members were bound by this determination.254 In its decision,
the Second Circuit distinguished Lamps Plus by pointing out that,
in that case, the question of class arbitration was submitted to the
court, not to the arbitrator as in Jock.255 The Jock Court also pointed out that its decision was consistent with the Supreme Court’s
previous ruling in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, which also
upheld an arbitrator’s determination that the contract permitted
class arbitration.256 Therefore, at least where the parties agree to
send the interpretation of the agreement to an arbitrator, there is
some chance that a court will uphold the arbitrator’s authorization
of class proceedings.257
Nevertheless, just as Congress responded to judicial hostility
towards arbitration when passing the FAA, it is now time for the
legislature to respond to the modern Court’s hostility towards class
arbitration. Many commentators, including some Justices, have
called for congressional action to fix the confusion surrounding the
FAA.258 Congressional action is certainly necessary to scale back
the Court’s expansion of the FAA, as there is little prospect of the
Court doing so on its own. There is also little hope for states being
able to protect their residents due to the ever-expanding FAA
preemption doctrine, which has now been used to invalidate all
sorts of state legislation.259 Amending the FAA to expressly permit
class arbitration is likely necessary to overcome the years of the
254

Jock v. Sterling Jewelers Inc., 942 F.3d 617, 620 (2d Cir. 2019).
See id. at 626.
256
See Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 569 U.S. 564, 573 (2013).
257
See id.; see also Ala. Psychiatric Servs., P.C. v. Lazenby, 292 So. 3d 295,
307–08 (Ala. 2019) (holding that an arbitrator did not exceed his power by finding that class arbitration was available).
258
See, e.g., Szalai, Arbitration Docket, supra note 135, at 124; Lamps Plus,
Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1422 (2019) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
259
See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 64.
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Court’s hostility towards class proceedings. Doing so would be a
significant step for employees who may be relying on the availability of class proceedings to vindicate their rights. On the other hand,
an amendment expressly banning or disfavoring class arbitration
would also resolve the confusion surrounding class proceedings
and would actually constitute the clear congressional intent that the
Court has been grabbing at for years. Alternatively, the Court
could simply scale back the FAA to its intended purpose of governing arbitration agreements between sophisticated parties and
address arbitration in other sectors separately.260 This would allow
the Court to be more precise as to its intent with regard to arbitration in specific circumstances, including the arbitration of employment disputes.
Over the years, both Congress and federal agencies have made
attempts at changing certain aspects of the FAA.261 However, these
single pieces of legislation do not address the bigger issue created
by FAA preemption, and more precise action is required specifically in regard to class arbitration.262 Further, if Congress intends to
260

Cf. Wilson, supra note 22, at 139 n.232 (giving examples of attempts of
industry-specific amendments to FAA). In September 2019, the House of Representatives passed the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, which would
“prohibit predispute arbitration agreements that force arbitration of future employment, consumer, antitrust, or civil rights disputes.” See Forced Arbitration
Injustice Repeal Act H.R. 1423, 116 Cong. § 2 (as passed by House, Sept. 20,
2019). This bill would pull back on the use of arbitration in sectors where the
other party to the agreement has little bargaining power. See id. However, as of
the date of this Comment, the Senate has not yet voted on the bill. See S.610 Forced
Arbitration
Injustice
Repeal
Act,
CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/610/actions (last visited Nov. 18, 2020).
261
See SHIMABUKURO & STAMAN, supra note 18, at 16 (discussing several
bills introduced in the 115th Congress regarding mandatory arbitration agreements); JON O. SHIMABUKURO, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL30934, THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT: BACKGROUND AND RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 7 (2003) (discussing some legislative bills aimed at mandatory arbitration such as one proposing an amendment to FAA to address arbitration of employment disputes);
Weston, Death of Class Arbitration, supra note 241, at 792–94 (discussing federal legislative action regarding mandatory arbitration).
262
See Weston, The Accidental Preemption Statute, supra note 26, at 72
(“Congress has enacted piecemeal legislation to address specific consumer protection and policy concerns.”). See also id. (“A clear statement by Congress
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keep class arbitration alive, uniform class arbitration rules could
benefit all parties by setting standards and preventing due process
violations of parties’ rights, further mitigating any concerns the
Court may have.263
CONCLUSION
Through its decision in Lamps Plus,264 the Court once again
found a way to cut back on the availability of class arbitrations as a
procedural option for parties seeking to vindicate their rights.
Through its demeaning characterization of class arbitration as less
efficient and unmanageable, the Court further solidified its view
that class arbitration is incompatible with the goals of the FAA. In
doing so, it unnecessarily expanded on the FAA’s preemptive
powers, holding that the FAA preempted the state contract rule of
contra proferentem. The Court’s view, however, has little basis in
law or logic when one considers the potential benefits class proceedings offer and the potential for class arbitration to be just as
efficient as individual arbitration, if not more in some circumstances.
As a result of this decision, countless employees and consumers subject to mandatory arbitration clauses will find themselves
unable to seek relief through class arbitration proceedings, even if
they are not subject to an explicit class action waiver. With the use
of mandatory arbitration on the rise,265 more and more employees
and consumers may potentially be unable to hold employers and
businesses accountable for their wrongdoings. Therefore, immediate congressional action is necessary to address this judicial hostility towards class arbitration.

reinforcing the FAA’s original purpose to enforce voluntary arbitration agreements, within the bounds of state and federal law, is warranted.”).
263
See Weston, Universes Colliding, supra note 162, at 1732–42 (discussing
three procedural approaches used for class arbitrations absent uniform rules).
264
See Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1419 (2019).
265
See supra note 15.

